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The Future of the Teesta River Project amidst New Developments in Bangladesh: A Geopolitical Quagmire

Samia Zaman

4 September 2025

The Teesta River Project is a much-needed development project for Bangladesh, the successful completion of which has become a challenge amidst new developments in Bangladesh. Teesta, being the fourth largest river in Bangladesh, is transboundary in nature shared by Bangladesh and India. Originating in Sikkim, the water of the river is critical to the lives of the people of both countries. About 40 million people live in the Teesta river basin in both Bangladesh and India, among which 30 million live on the Bangladesh side.[1] Teesta is a vital waterway of the northern region of Bangladesh comprising the Nilphamary, Rangpur, Dinajpur, Bogra, Gaibandha and Joypurhat, which is called the granary of Bangladesh.


A water sharing agreement of the Teesta river water has been a long-standing demand from Bangladesh and has long dominated the bilateral talks between the two countries since the 1980s.[2] Years of negotiation between the two countries failed to resolve the issue. To date, there is no agreement between the two countries on the water sharing of the river. Bangladesh claims that India withdraws more and more water upstream by constructing various dams, barrages, and other hydro-power structures. It is said that before the Teesta river enters Bangladesh from India, it passes through a series of dams which have been constructed for hydroelectric power generation that divert and weaken the waterflow of the Teesta river.[3] Bangladesh claims it does not get an equitable and fair share of water from the Teesta river. In the absence of a water sharing agreement in the basin, water scarcity remains a big problem in Bangladesh.


External Actors and the Teesta River Project


The Indian view on concluding a water sharing agreement of the Teesta river is more complex. During Bangladeshi PM Sheikh Hasina’s visit to New Delhi in 2010 and Indian PM Manmohan Singh’s visit to Bangladesh in 2011, efforts were on to finalize a deal between the two countries on the Teesta river. [4] However, the deal did not materialize due to opposition from West Bengal’s Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee. [5] Later in 2017, During Sheikh Hasina’s Visit to India, after concluding a meeting with Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, CM Mamata Banerjee claimed that  the volume of the water is decreasing in the Teesta river. Terming Teesta as the lifeline for the northern part of West Bengal, she  said that if Teesta water is shared, there will be a problem of water for drinking and irrigation purposes.[6] She made an alternative proposal to Bangladesh to use the water of five other common rivers namely, Torsa, Dharala, Jaldhaka, Dansiri and Mansiri to meet its requirement, but did not agree to share Teesta’s water based on any agreement. Lately in 2025, when the Modi government held a dialogue with the Hasina government on sharing of the waters of the common rivers during Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India, Mamata Banerjee wrote a letter to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, strongly resenting the Centre's decision to exclude her government from talks with Bangladesh, calling it a blow to federal unity. She cited the Modi-Hasina discussion on water sharing of the common rivers as ‘unilateral deliberations’, considering that ‘water is a state subject’.[7] Against the backdrop of the deadlock between the two countries on Teesta river water sharing, Bangladesh planned to dredge and develop its portion of the Teesta river. Bangladesh’s initiative to manage its major rivers drew Chinese attention. In 2016, before the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Bangladesh, a Chinese company, PowerChina initiated a comprehensive river management project for Bangladesh which was initially centered on river Yamuna.[8] Later, the Teesta river was also included and PowerChina articulated the 'Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project', with an estimated cost of USD 1 Billion. When President Xi visited Bangladesh, he signed MoUs worth USD 24 Billion, including one on river management. The Bangladesh Power Development board also signed an MoU with PowerChina to work in the water sector of Bangladesh.


Upon submitting the feasibility study done by the Chinese power company, the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project (TRCMRP) was approved in 2019. The proposed project had seven objectives, namely, river regime control, flood control and disaster reduction through construction and repair of embankments, restoration of water system by river dredging, facilitation of navigation by river dredging, land reclamation and development, increasing water availability in the river by storing water for dry season, irrigation through hydraulic structures, and restoration of environmental and ecological system of project area.[9] Although the project is aimed at increasing the availability of water in the river by reviving the river system through different means, it is not clear how a power generation company of China, named PowerChina will handle the river management and restoration project. The project is expected to increase the depth of the river by dredging, which will increase the navigability of the river. Even in that case, experts opine that it is not a permanent solution. During the monsoon season and flash floods, the project will face compound challenges. Besides, there are proposals of construction of ports, roads and jetties at the proposed site which have little connection with river management and restoration. Consequently, there is skepticism revolving around the intent and effectiveness of the project.


The Case for Regional Cooperation


Under such circumstances, India has also signaled its interest to finance the project during former Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina’s state visit to India in June, 2024.[10] There is speculation that India might be wary of China’s presence in the proposed site of the project which is also close to the Siliguri Corridor or the ‘Chicken’s Neck’ in India.[11] The Siliguri Corridor, a narrow stretch of land located in West Bengal which connects India’s northeastern states with the rest of India, is believed to be a vulnerable point for India’s security. Given China and India’s long standing, complex border dispute, Chinese presence in the proposed site of the Teesta river project area is a security threat to India. Regarding this, Dhaka responded that it will “take into cognizance the geopolitical issues”.


Understanding the project’s geopolitical implication for the region and India’s border instability, Sheikh Hasina assured India that her country will accept India’s USD 1 billion proposal for the development of the river basin and thus declined the Chinese offer.[12] It was reported that Indian and Bangladeshi leaders had discussed how to manage water flows in Teesta, not how to share water. However, West Bengal’s Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee conveyed her reservation to the Prime Minister of India that the central government should not discuss any water sharing discussion on Teesta without the state government’s involvement.[13] There is no doubt that the Hasina regime accepted the proposal from India even after knowing the complexities between the central government of India and the state government of West Bengal surrounding the sharing and managing of Teesta water on the basis of a bilateral agreement. Although China expressed its deep interest in assisting Bangladesh on the Teesta river management project, it seemed Bangladesh under Hasina’s rule took into account India’s geopolitical concerns. The growing economic partnership of Bangladesh with China could not limit Hasina government’s choices to take a balancing strategy against both India and China. With such diplomatic moves, the Hasina regime was renowned for maintaining an ambiguity in balancing both India and China.[14] After the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government, the new interim government, led by Professor Dr. Muhammad Yunus signaled its keen interest to develop a close relationship with China. Many scholars are viewing Bangladesh’s new diplomatic postures as a significant shift from its past regimes. It appears that the new leadership of Bangladesh has shown its willingness to discard the balancing strategy of the past governments and decided to choose China’s side. Amid such developments, the new interim government of Bangladesh wants China to finance the stalled Teesta river management project. Both Bangladesh and China are working together to advance the project since Muhammad Yunus visited China in March 2025.[15]


Conclusion: Bangladesh’s Foreign Policy Options for the Teesta River Project


For years, Bangladesh has been practicing a foreign policy dictum of “Friendship to all, malice towards none”.  It was long served as a key strategy for ensuring and safeguarding the national interest of a newly independent small country. However, after 50 years of independence, many people question the pragmatism of the foreign policy dictum of Bangladesh. Bangladesh needs to think beyond its small country stature. Being located in a geopolitically significant region with access to Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh is increasingly faced with different foreign policy challenges. As the geopolitical landscape of the region is transforming, Bangladesh is presently recalibrating its foreign relations with different regional and extra-regional actors like India, China, and the United States. Bangladesh’s decision to recalibrate its regional alliances is facilitating a geopolitical shift in South Asia.[16] Although Professor Muhammad Yunus declared that Bangladesh is “reaching out to everybody”, foreign policy shifts under his leadership are evidently signaling that Bangladesh has ended its past India-centric orientation and is tilting more heavily towards China and other regional partners.[17]Seeking Chinese assistance to implement the Teesta river project in Bangladesh is a manifestation of China’s increasing influence on the country. Apparently, it seems that Bangladesh has ended its balancing strategy between China and India on implementing Teesta river project and escaped the geopolitical quagmire. However, if Bangladesh becomes too reliant on any single major power, it may fail to uphold its strategic autonomy.

  1. Hye, Hasnat Abdul. “The political economy of Teesta river,” The Financial Express, 14 May 2024.

  2. Chakma, Bhumitra. “Sheikh Hasina Government’s India Policy: A Three-level Game?”, Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs 2(1) 27–51, 2015 SAGE Publications

  3. Shuprova Tasneem, ‘Bangladesh can’t wait forever to resolve the Teesta issue’, The Daily Star, 05 September 2022.

  4. Bagchi, Indrani. “Manmohan Singh, Sheikh Hasina put Teesta behind, fix boundary”, Times of India, 07 September 2011.

  5. Bagchi, Indrani. “Manmohan Singh, Sheikh Hasina put Teesta behind, fix boundary”

  6. Karim, Rezaul and  Bhattacharya, Pallab, “Teesta has no water to share”, The Daily Star,  09 April 2017.

  7. Purohit, Devadeep and Sinha, Avijit.  “Not feasible: Mamata Banerjee on Teesta water sharing with Bangladesh”, The Telegraph, 25 June 2025. Available at https://www.telegraphindia.com/west-bengal/not-feasible-mamata-banerjee-on-teesta-water-sharing-with-bangladesh/cid/2029342 

  8. Islam, Nazrul. “Teesta project: Does Bangladesh have no alternative to China and India?”,Prothom Alo 16 May 2024. 

  9. Azaz, Mohammad. “Teesta River Comprehensive Management Project: How comprehensive will it be?”. The Business Standard 19 Nov. 2020.

  10. “India signals interest in Bangladesh's Teesta project eyed by China”. The Business Standard 23 Jun. 2024.

  11. Pant, Harsh V & Bose, Sohini, “PM Hasina’s second India sojourn: Paving the future of New Delhi-Dhaka ties”. Observer Research Foundation.  28 Jun. 2024.

  12. Siddiqui, Huma. “Bangladesh chooses India’s Teesta river project over China’s proposal”, The Financial Express 26 Jun. 2024.

  13. Singh, Shiv Sahay .“What is holding up the Teesta treaty? Explained”, The Hindu 30 Jun. 2024. 

  14. Noor, Wahiduzzaman & Wong, Samantha, “Bangladesh may have ended its India-China tightrope game, but it must continue to tread carefully”, available at https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/bangladesh-may-have-ended-its-india-china-tightrope-game-but-it-must-continue-to-tread-carefully/ 

  15. Rahman, Arifur. “Teesta project: Bangladesh seeks Tk 67 billion Chinese loan”, Prothom Alo, 19 August, 2025. 

  16. Laila, Nazam. “Bangladesh is helping to create a geopolitical shift in South Asia”,  Chatham House, 13 June 2025. Available at https://www.chathamhouse.org/2025/06/bangladesh-helping-create-geopolitical-shift-south-asia 

  17. Laila, Nazam. “Bangladesh is helping to create a geopolitical shift in South Asia”.

Endnotes

The Teesta River, the fourth largest in Bangladesh, is a transboundary waterway shared with India that supports nearly 40 million people, including 30 million in Bangladesh’s northern agricultural belt. Despite its critical role, decades of negotiations have failed to yield a water-sharing agreement. Dhaka argues that India’s upstream dams and diversions reduce river flow, leaving Bangladesh with recurring water scarcity and deepening strains in bilateral relations.

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