According to projections by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), climate change could displace as many as 200 million individuals by the mid-21st century.[i] In a telling move, the Paris Agreement deliberately avoided the term "climate refugee," opting for "human mobility." The World Bank's data paints a striking picture for South Asia, forecasting over 40 million internal migrants by 2050, nearly 1.8% of its current population. Despite these daunting statistics, a cohesive regional strategy to address the crisis remains elusive in South Asia. Even the recent G20 Summit in India, though marked by significant pledges to combat climate change, fell short of addressing the imminent threat of widespread displacement among the most vulnerable groups in South Asia.

So, one has to wonder: what factors hinder discussions about climate migration[ii] in South Asia, and what are its implications?

DEFINITIONAL DILEMMAS AND POLITICAL IMPEDIMENTS IN CLIMATE MIGRATION NARRATIVES

Increasingly, climate change has been linked with migration.[iii] At the global level, international environmental regimes are yet to bring clarity and detail on the term to be used to describe people compelled to relocate due to the unprecedented impact of climate change, such as floods, drought, soil erosion, desertification, deforestation etc. This is evident with the presence of different terms in the discourse that are often used interchangeably to describe these affected populations: “environment refugee”, “climate refugee”, “climate displaced”, “environmentally displaced persons”, “climate migrant”, “climate-induced migration”, and “climate displaced”. These terms have evolved over the last fifty years and are fraught with legal and political tensions. Reservations remain over the use of the term ‘refugee’ over ‘migrant’ in popular discourse.[1]

To contextualize, one of the first terms used, ‘environmental refugee’, originated from fears of resource scarcity generated by the OPEC Oil Crisis of 1973 and Cold War tensions. Reservations emerged where migration resulted from population growth exceeding environmental limits. The term was coined in the 1970s by environmental analyst Lester Brown of the World Watch Institute.[iv]Subsequently, the term was popularized by Essam El-Hinnawi in 1985 in a paper published in the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). He defined ‘environment refugees’ as "those people who have been forced to leave their traditional habitat, temporarily or permanently, because of a marked environmental disruption (natural and triggered by people) that jeopardises their existence and/or seriously affects the quality of their life."[v]Critics reviewed this definition as too broad and simplistic. Scholar de Haas (2020) questions the broad usage of the term ‘climate migration’, as it creates a deterministic link between climate change and migration.[vi]Whether climate change leads to cross-border migration, causes long-term displacement, or triggers a new kind of migration pattern has been vehemently debated in academic and policy discourse.

The evolution of other terminologies related to climate migration gained significant momentum post-Hurricane Katrina in 2005.[vii] Interestingly, the aftermath of this devastating event universalized the term “climate refugee”. This incident not only underscored the potential magnitude of climate-induced displacement but also emphasized that such impacts could significantly affect even developed nations like the United States.[viii] Once limited to academic and policy circles, the associated terms with climate migration have also become part of mainstream discourse, putting pressure on world leaders to confront its implications. However, states maintain that recognizing climate migration can compromise sovereignty, impact resource distribution, and have geopolitical implications. Thereby, states have exercised their discretionary powers on this issue.

This ambiguity presents more than just a linguistic challenge. Neither the 1951 Geneva Convention nor its amendment to the 1967 Protocol recognize the abovementioned terms, potentially exacerbating a lack of political will to confront the issue. Additionally, other notable international frameworks on climate change and refugees—including the Paris Agreement in 2015 and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) in 2019—are yet to use specific terminologies to address linkages between climate change and migration.

Country-specific case studies have only recently emerged, acknowledging displacement caused by climate change, such as Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand.[2]Herein, the UN Human Rights Committee in 2020 identified that climate change can threaten the right to life. Yet, achieving legal and binding recognition in the international environment and human rights law remains a distant goal.

The role of UN agencies in advocating for legal clarity on climate migration has also remained unclear. For instance, international bodies like UNHCR and IOM acknowledge the role of climate change in displacing populations internally but have refrained from using the abovementioned terms.

A lack of consensus on what constitutes climate migration poses challenges in mobilizing resources, enacting legal protections, and generating the global response necessary to address this growing phenomenon. Consequently, without clear definitions, ambiguity in the current usage of terms and lack of political will eventually impact the lives of people affected by climate change. The affected population may not be entitled to the same international protections, rights, and support as those fleeing persecution or conflict. This legal gap can leave climate migrants in a vulnerable position.

NATIONAL INTERESTS AND SOVEREIGNTY: BARRIERS TO RECOGNIZING CLIMATE MIGRATION IN SOUTH ASIA

Given these ambiguities in defining climate migration and the larger global dynamics, South Asia's discourse on “climate migration” remains fragmented and driven by national interest, reflecting the broader inefficiencies in international environmental regimes and regional governance.

As evidenced in the regional commitments regarding the protection of refugees, barring Afghanistan, most South Asian countries have not signed the 1951 Geneva Convention and its subsequent 1967 amendment. It is pertinent to recognize that despite not being parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention, nations like India and Bangladesh have historically provided asylum to a substantial number of refugees. In 2020, these two countries took in the largest refugee populations within the South-East Asian region.[ix]

A breakthrough was achieved when South Asian countries adopted the non-binding Global Compact on Refugees in 2019, which was formulated to encourage host countries to share responsibility more effectively in supporting refugees.[x]

South Asian states have carefully navigated their climate change commitments, and refrained from the linkages between climate change and migration. Driven by their national interest and security perspective, the Indian delegation, at the preliminary session of the Global Compact on Refugees at the UNGA, stated, “We must be fully conscious that persons displaced by natural disasters or climate change are not refugees. Their needs are urgent but very different. Likewise, those internally displaced are not refugees. The role played by humanitarian actors in such contexts should only be with the consent and at the request of a State.”[xi] Likewise, Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina welcomed the GCR. In her address, she focused on the safe and sustainable return of the Rohingya refugees to Myanmar. She remarked, “Safe and sustainable return to the country of origin is particularly important to resolve protracted refugee crisis. Greater attention needs to be paid to remove the root causes that drive people to become refugees, and those root causes lie in the countries of origin.”[xii]

Recently, there has been increased interest in the Indian subcontinent towards finding pathways for safe, orderly, and regular migration. South Asian countries with burgeoning young populations (such as Bangladesh, Nepal and India) have actively supported the implementation of the UN-led Global Compact for Migration (adopted in 2018) through national implementation frameworks and focus on skilled e-migration.[xiii]

Another reason that explains the reluctance of states to recognize climate-induced migration includes concerns over the potential economic strain and social cohesion. The increasing rate of internal migration and circular mobility patterns remains a policy challenge for countries with growing populations like India and Bangladesh. These countries are already facing problems of overcrowding in urban cities, increased population density, and conflict over resources-sharing. States fear that climate migration can bring the additional ‘burden’ of accommodating a large number of displaced people. It can lead to financial and political instability.[xiv] These narratives are not new and are already present for the current migrant and refugee groups housed across borders. For instance, the Bangladeshi and Nepali migrant workers in India constitute a large share of the migrant labor population. They are frequently viewed with suspicion and scorn as a "burden" on the Indian economy.[xv]

Finally, the discourse on climate-induced migration in South Asia often intertwines with other regional issues that have been heavily securitized, such as shared water resources, border control, and regional cooperation. For instance, the Indus Water Treaty between India and Pakistan[3] or the Teesta water-sharing negotiations between India and Bangladesh[4] are not directly about climate refugees but are intrinsically connected to environmental and climatic factors that could influence future migrations. Recognizing and addressing the issue of climate refugees could further complicate such long-standing disputes. As climate change crises intensify, countries sharing river basins (like India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh) could face heightened tensions over climate migration due to water scarcity become a reality.[xvi]

FOCUS ON MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION:

Despite the non-recognition of climate migration in high politics, South Asian countries have ramped up their efforts to mitigate and prevent the large-scale impact of climate change. Recent decades have seen a growing convergence in the recognition of climate change in South Asian geopolitics as a non-traditional threat to security. At the regional level, two inter-governmental regional organizations initially emerged with promise in this regard. Firstly, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Plan of Action on Climate Change in 2008 and 2010 adopted the Thimphu Statement on Climate Change, showcasing a mutual recognition of the need for a regional approach to tackle climate change. Secondly, the Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technological and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) included climate change as one of the priority areas at the Fourteenth BIMSTEC Ministerial Meeting in Myanmar. Environment and Climate Change is among the seven priority sectors, with Bhutan as the lead Member State. In March 2023, BIMSTEC approved the ‘Mountain Economy’[xvii] as a sub-sector under the Environment and Climate Change sector. The mitigation and adaptation strategies adopted through these initiatives include promoting low-carbon technologies, regional afforestation and reforestation campaigns, incorporating green technology in development, comprehensive risk assessment studies, and institutional linkages for knowledge sharing. However, the reach of these regional organizations has remained limited. Therefore, the road ahead must include more proactive adaptive measures that directly address climate-induced migration alongside a mutual solidarity framework that fosters trust and accountability.[xviii]

IMPLICATIONS:

A combination of these causes has given a geopolitical dimension to the process of consensus-building around climate migration. This has impeded the recognition of climate migration as a legitimate regional concern in need of coordinated action to provide welfare to those forced to move because of climate change.

First, the lack of legal ambiguity to recognize “climate migration” has resulted in the unavailability of credible data to analyze and make policy-level decisions. Policy approaches may continue to be biased in the absence of sufficient data to fully assess the impact of migration at numerous sites (including origin and destination) and their interconnection. Second, contemporary issues like climate change can act as an opportunity for better regional integration and cooperation, but if ignored, the cost of non-cooperation can worsen regional cohesion. The growing anti-migrant trend in the subcontinent can further affect people-to-people relations and contribute to militarized borders.

The regional failure to address climate migration has been confounded by its geopolitical implications. Third-party players, including international organizations, are filling the gap in policy action. For instance, the World Bank and the Red Cross have provided operational assistance for national disaster management programs. The South Asia Water Initiative gives states technical support to operationalize flood forecasting in the Ganges Basin. The creation of climate-resilient policies and investments are also supported through the Climate Adaptation and Resilience for South Asia project. Additionally, bilateral funders, the UK and the aid agency DFID assist in developing early-warning systems for communities in South Asia through the Asia Regional Resilience to a Changing Climate programme.[xix]

CONCLUSION

This commentary set out to identify the causes that prevent a discussion on “climate-induced migration” in South Asia and render an inefficient international environmental regime in the region. The detailed discussion concludes that the issue of climate-induced migration in South Asia is intricately linked with regional geopolitics. As climate change intensifies, the need for a unified approach becomes paramount. While individual country initiatives on mitigation and prevention are in place, a regional response mechanism is still missing. The intertwined nature of climate concerns with national interests, resource sharing, and legal complexities has complicated the discourse. On one hand, the lack of a cohesive response to the climate refugee issue could sow seeds of resentment among nations in the region. Countries that bear the brunt of migration without adequate support from their neighbors could perceive this as apathy or sabotage. If not addressed, such feelings can manifest in various ways: from diplomatic coldness to economic sanctions or skirmishes. On the other, this also presents an opportunity for South Asian countries to come together and address not just the challenge of climate migration but also foster greater regional cooperation and unity.